70 lines
2.6 KiB
ReStructuredText
70 lines
2.6 KiB
ReStructuredText
L1D Flushing
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============
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With an increasing number of vulnerabilities being reported around data
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leaks from the Level 1 Data cache (L1D) the kernel provides an opt-in
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mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch.
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This mechanism can be used to address e.g. CVE-2020-0550. For applications
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the mechanism keeps them safe from vulnerabilities, related to leaks
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(snooping of) from the L1D cache.
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Related CVEs
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------------
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The following CVEs can be addressed by this
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mechanism
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============= ======================== ==================
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CVE-2020-0550 Improper Data Forwarding OS related aspects
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============= ======================== ==================
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Usage Guidelines
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----------------
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Please see document: :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
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<set_spec_ctrl>` for details.
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**NOTE**: The feature is disabled by default, applications need to
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specifically opt into the feature to enable it.
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Mitigation
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----------
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When PR_SET_L1D_FLUSH is enabled for a task a flush of the L1D cache is
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performed when the task is scheduled out and the incoming task belongs to a
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different process and therefore to a different address space.
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If the underlying CPU supports L1D flushing in hardware, the hardware
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mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported.
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Mitigation control on the kernel command line
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---------------------------------------------
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The kernel command line allows to control the L1D flush mitigations at boot
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time with the option "l1d_flush=". The valid arguments for this option are:
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============ =============================================================
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on Enables the prctl interface, applications trying to use
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the prctl() will fail with an error if l1d_flush is not
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enabled
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============ =============================================================
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By default the mechanism is disabled.
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Limitations
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-----------
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The mechanism does not mitigate L1D data leaks between tasks belonging to
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different processes which are concurrently executing on sibling threads of
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a physical CPU core when SMT is enabled on the system.
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This can be addressed by controlled placement of processes on physical CPU
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cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation
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document: :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
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**NOTE** : The opt-in of a task for L1D flushing works only when the task's
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affinity is limited to cores running in non-SMT mode. If a task which
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requested L1D flushing is scheduled on a SMT-enabled core the kernel sends
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a SIGBUS to the task.
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