414 lines
13 KiB
C
414 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
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*/
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#include "queueing.h"
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#include "timers.h"
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#include "device.h"
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#include "peer.h"
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#include "socket.h"
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#include "messages.h"
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#include "cookie.h"
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#include <linux/uio.h>
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#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
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#include <net/udp.h>
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#include <net/sock.h>
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static void wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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struct message_handshake_initiation packet;
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if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake),
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REKEY_TIMEOUT))
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return; /* This function is rate limited. */
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atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns());
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake initiation to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n",
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peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id,
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&peer->endpoint.addr);
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if (wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(&packet, &peer->handshake)) {
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wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer);
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer);
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer);
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atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake,
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ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns());
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wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet, sizeof(packet),
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HANDSHAKE_DSCP);
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wg_timers_handshake_initiated(peer);
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}
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}
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void wg_packet_handshake_send_worker(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer,
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transmit_handshake_work);
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wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation(peer);
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wg_peer_put(peer);
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}
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void wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(struct wg_peer *peer,
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bool is_retry)
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{
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if (!is_retry)
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peer->timer_handshake_attempts = 0;
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rcu_read_lock_bh();
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/* We check last_sent_handshake here in addition to the actual function
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* we're queueing up, so that we don't queue things if not strictly
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* necessary:
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*/
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if (!wg_birthdate_has_expired(atomic64_read(&peer->last_sent_handshake),
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REKEY_TIMEOUT) ||
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unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)))
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goto out;
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wg_peer_get(peer);
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/* Queues up calling packet_send_queued_handshakes(peer), where we do a
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* peer_put(peer) after:
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*/
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if (!queue_work(peer->device->handshake_send_wq,
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&peer->transmit_handshake_work))
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/* If the work was already queued, we want to drop the
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* extra reference:
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*/
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wg_peer_put(peer);
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out:
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rcu_read_unlock_bh();
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}
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void wg_packet_send_handshake_response(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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struct message_handshake_response packet;
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atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake, ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns());
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending handshake response to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n",
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peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id,
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&peer->endpoint.addr);
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if (wg_noise_handshake_create_response(&packet, &peer->handshake)) {
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wg_cookie_add_mac_to_packet(&packet, sizeof(packet), peer);
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if (wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(&peer->handshake,
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&peer->keypairs)) {
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wg_timers_session_derived(peer);
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer);
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer);
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atomic64_set(&peer->last_sent_handshake,
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ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns());
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wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer(peer, &packet,
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sizeof(packet),
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HANDSHAKE_DSCP);
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}
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}
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}
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void wg_packet_send_handshake_cookie(struct wg_device *wg,
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struct sk_buff *initiating_skb,
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__le32 sender_index)
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{
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struct message_handshake_cookie packet;
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net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Sending cookie response for denied handshake message for %pISpfsc\n",
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wg->dev->name, initiating_skb);
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wg_cookie_message_create(&packet, initiating_skb, sender_index,
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&wg->cookie_checker);
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wg_socket_send_buffer_as_reply_to_skb(wg, initiating_skb, &packet,
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sizeof(packet));
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}
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static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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struct noise_keypair *keypair;
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bool send;
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rcu_read_lock_bh();
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keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair);
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send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) &&
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(atomic64_read(&keypair->sending_counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
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(keypair->i_am_the_initiator &&
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wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME)));
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rcu_read_unlock_bh();
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if (unlikely(send))
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wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false);
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}
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static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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unsigned int padded_size, last_unit = skb->len;
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if (unlikely(!PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu))
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return ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - last_unit;
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/* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking
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* layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we
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* wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the
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* padded_size being clamped. Fortunately, that's very rarely the case,
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* so we optimize for that not happening.
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*/
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if (unlikely(last_unit > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu))
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last_unit %= PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu;
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padded_size = min(PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu,
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ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE));
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return padded_size - last_unit;
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}
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static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair)
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{
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unsigned int padding_len, plaintext_len, trailer_len;
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struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8];
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struct message_data *header;
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struct sk_buff *trailer;
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int num_frags;
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/* Force hash calculation before encryption so that flow analysis is
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* consistent over the inner packet.
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*/
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skb_get_hash(skb);
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/* Calculate lengths. */
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padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb);
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trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0);
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plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len;
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/* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */
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num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer);
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if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg)))
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return false;
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/* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part
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* of the skb.
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*/
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memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len);
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/* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network
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* stack's headers.
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*/
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if (unlikely(skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM) < 0))
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return false;
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/* Finalize checksum calculation for the inner packet, if required. */
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if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
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skb_checksum_help(skb)))
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return false;
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/* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end
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* and the header.
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*/
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skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, 0);
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header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(*header));
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header->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_DATA);
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header->key_idx = keypair->remote_index;
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header->counter = cpu_to_le64(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce);
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pskb_put(skb, trailer, trailer_len);
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/* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */
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sg_init_table(sg, num_frags);
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if (skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data),
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noise_encrypted_len(plaintext_len)) <= 0)
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return false;
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return chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(sg, plaintext_len, NULL, 0,
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PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce,
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keypair->sending.key);
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}
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void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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struct sk_buff *skb;
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if (skb_queue_empty(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) {
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skb = alloc_skb(DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM + MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH,
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GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!skb))
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return;
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skb_reserve(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM);
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skb->dev = peer->device->dev;
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PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu = skb->dev->mtu;
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skb_queue_tail(&peer->staged_packet_queue, skb);
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Sending keepalive packet to peer %llu (%pISpfsc)\n",
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peer->device->dev->name, peer->internal_id,
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&peer->endpoint.addr);
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}
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wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer);
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}
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static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first)
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{
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struct sk_buff *skb, *next;
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bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false;
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_traversal(peer);
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wg_timers_any_authenticated_packet_sent(peer);
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skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) {
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is_keepalive = skb->len == message_data_len(0);
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if (likely(!wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer(peer, skb,
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PACKET_CB(skb)->ds) && !is_keepalive))
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data_sent = true;
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}
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if (likely(data_sent))
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wg_timers_data_sent(peer);
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keep_key_fresh(peer);
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}
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void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, transmit_packet_work);
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struct noise_keypair *keypair;
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enum packet_state state;
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struct sk_buff *first;
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while ((first = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue)) != NULL &&
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(state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) !=
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PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) {
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wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->tx_queue);
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keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair;
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if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED))
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wg_packet_create_data_done(peer, first);
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else
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kfree_skb_list(first);
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wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false);
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wg_peer_put(peer);
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if (need_resched())
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cond_resched();
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}
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}
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void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct multicore_worker,
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work)->ptr;
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struct sk_buff *first, *skb, *next;
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while ((first = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) {
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enum packet_state state = PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED;
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skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) {
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if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb,
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PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) {
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wg_reset_packet(skb, true);
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} else {
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state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD;
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break;
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}
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}
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wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, state);
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if (need_resched())
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cond_resched();
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}
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}
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static void wg_packet_create_data(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first)
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{
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struct wg_device *wg = peer->device;
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int ret = -EINVAL;
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rcu_read_lock_bh();
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if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)))
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goto err;
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ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, &peer->tx_queue, first,
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wg->packet_crypt_wq);
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if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE))
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wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, PACKET_STATE_DEAD);
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err:
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rcu_read_unlock_bh();
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if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE))
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return;
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wg_noise_keypair_put(PACKET_CB(first)->keypair, false);
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wg_peer_put(peer);
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kfree_skb_list(first);
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}
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void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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peer->device->dev->stats.tx_dropped += peer->staged_packet_queue.qlen;
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__skb_queue_purge(&peer->staged_packet_queue);
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spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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}
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void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
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{
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struct noise_keypair *keypair;
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struct sk_buff_head packets;
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struct sk_buff *skb;
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/* Steal the current queue into our local one. */
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__skb_queue_head_init(&packets);
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spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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skb_queue_splice_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue, &packets);
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spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&packets)))
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return;
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/* First we make sure we have a valid reference to a valid key. */
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rcu_read_lock_bh();
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keypair = wg_noise_keypair_get(
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rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair));
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rcu_read_unlock_bh();
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if (unlikely(!keypair))
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goto out_nokey;
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if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)))
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goto out_nokey;
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if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate,
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REJECT_AFTER_TIME)))
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goto out_invalid;
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/* After we know we have a somewhat valid key, we now try to assign
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* nonces to all of the packets in the queue. If we can't assign nonces
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* for all of them, we just consider it a failure and wait for the next
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* handshake.
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*/
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skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb) {
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/* 0 for no outer TOS: no leak. TODO: at some later point, we
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* might consider using flowi->tos as outer instead.
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*/
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PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb);
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PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce =
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atomic64_inc_return(&keypair->sending_counter) - 1;
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if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
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goto out_invalid;
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}
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packets.prev->next = NULL;
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wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer);
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PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair;
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wg_packet_create_data(peer, packets.next);
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return;
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out_invalid:
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WRITE_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid, false);
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out_nokey:
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wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false);
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/* We orphan the packets if we're waiting on a handshake, so that they
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* don't block a socket's pool.
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*/
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skb_queue_walk(&packets, skb)
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skb_orphan(skb);
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/* Then we put them back on the top of the queue. We're not too
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* concerned about accidentally getting things a little out of order if
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* packets are being added really fast, because this queue is for before
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* packets can even be sent and it's small anyway.
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*/
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spin_lock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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skb_queue_splice(&packets, &peer->staged_packet_queue);
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spin_unlock_bh(&peer->staged_packet_queue.lock);
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/* If we're exiting because there's something wrong with the key, it
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* means we should initiate a new handshake.
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*/
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wg_packet_send_queued_handshake_initiation(peer, false);
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}
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