hamza.kesraoui/sst-linux
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

binfmt_flat: Fix integer overflow bug on 32 bit systems

Browse Source 
commit 55cf2f4b945f6a6416cc2524ba740b83cc9af25a upstream.

Most of these sizes and counts are capped at 256MB so the math doesn't
result in an integer overflow.  The "relocs" count needs to be checked
as well.  Otherwise on 32bit systems the calculation of "full_data"
could be wrong.

	full_data = data_len + relocs * sizeof(unsigned long);

Fixes: c995ee28d2 ("binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5be17f6c-5338-43be-91ef-650153b975cb@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Carpenter 2024-12-04 15:07:15 +03:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent e999c3020a
commit 95506c7f33
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
fs/binfmt_flat.c
View File

@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
* 28 bits (256 MB) is way more than reasonable in this case.
* If some top bits are set we have probable binary corruption.
*/
if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | full_data) >> 28) {
if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | relocs | full_data) >> 28) {
pr_err("bad header\n");
ret = -ENOEXEC;
goto err;