rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit

[ Upstream commit bd96a3935e89486304461a21752f824fc25e0f0b ]

The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.  It comes from
process_responses().  On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct
cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an
integer wrapping bug.  Use size_add() to prevent this.

Fixes: 1cab775c3e ("RDMA/cxgb4: Fix LE hash collision bug for passive open connection")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/86b404e1-4a75-4a35-a34e-e3054fa554c7@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Carpenter 2024-11-30 13:01:37 +03:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 2d4c46ad83
commit 4422f452d0

View File

@ -1114,8 +1114,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
* The math here assumes sizeof cpl_pass_accept_req >= sizeof
* cpl_rx_pkt.
*/
skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
sizeof(struct rss_header) - pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
sizeof(struct rss_header)) - pktshift,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return NULL;