rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit
[ Upstream commit bd96a3935e89486304461a21752f824fc25e0f0b ]
The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from
process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct
cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an
integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Fixes: 1cab775c3e
("RDMA/cxgb4: Fix LE hash collision bug for passive open connection")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/86b404e1-4a75-4a35-a34e-e3054fa554c7@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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parent
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@ -1114,8 +1114,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
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* The math here assumes sizeof cpl_pass_accept_req >= sizeof
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* cpl_rx_pkt.
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*/
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skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
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sizeof(struct rss_header) - pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
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skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
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sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
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sizeof(struct rss_header)) - pktshift,
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GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!skb))
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return NULL;
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