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* last HVF fix (Cameron)

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream' into staging

* last HVF fix (Cameron)

# gpg: Signature made Tue 03 Dec 2019 08:11:51 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key F13338574B662389866C7682BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg:                issuer "pbonzini@redhat.com"
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full]
# gpg:                 aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4  E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
#      Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C  7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83

* remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream:
  hvf: correctly inject VMCS_INTR_T_HWINTR versus VMCS_INTR_T_SWINTR.

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Maydell 2019-12-03 10:07:56 +00:00
commit 24d68f3737
2 changed files with 12 additions and 6 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
target/i386/hvf/hvf.c
View File

@ -637,6 +637,8 @@ static void hvf_store_events(CPUState *cpu, uint32_t ins_len, uint64_t idtvec_in
env->exception_injected = 0; env->exception_injected = 0;
env->interrupt_injected = -1; env->interrupt_injected = -1;
env->nmi_injected = false; env->nmi_injected = false;
env->ins_len = 0;
env->has_error_code = false;
if (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VALID) { if (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VALID) {
switch (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) { switch (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) {
case VMCS_IDT_VEC_HWINTR: case VMCS_IDT_VEC_HWINTR:
@ -659,7 +661,7 @@ static void hvf_store_events(CPUState *cpu, uint32_t ins_len, uint64_t idtvec_in
(idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) == VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWINTR) { (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) == VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWINTR) {
env->ins_len = ins_len; env->ins_len = ins_len;
} }
if (idtvec_info & VMCS_INTR_DEL_ERRCODE) { if (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_ERRCODE_VALID) {
env->has_error_code = true; env->has_error_code = true;
env->error_code = rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_ERROR); env->error_code = rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_ERROR);
} }

14
target/i386/hvf/x86hvf.c
View File

@ -345,8 +345,6 @@ void vmx_clear_int_window_exiting(CPUState *cpu)
~VMCS_PRI_PROC_BASED_CTLS_INT_WINDOW_EXITING); ~VMCS_PRI_PROC_BASED_CTLS_INT_WINDOW_EXITING);
} }
#define NMI_VEC 2
bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state) bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
{ {
X86CPU *x86cpu = X86_CPU(cpu_state); X86CPU *x86cpu = X86_CPU(cpu_state);
@ -357,7 +355,11 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
bool have_event = true; bool have_event = true;
if (env->interrupt_injected != -1) { if (env->interrupt_injected != -1) {
vector = env->interrupt_injected; vector = env->interrupt_injected;
intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_SWINTR; if (env->ins_len) {
intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_SWINTR;
} else {
intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_HWINTR;
}
} else if (env->exception_nr != -1) { } else if (env->exception_nr != -1) {
vector = env->exception_nr; vector = env->exception_nr;
if (vector == EXCP03_INT3 || vector == EXCP04_INTO) { if (vector == EXCP03_INT3 || vector == EXCP04_INTO) {
@ -366,7 +368,7 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_HWEXCEPTION; intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_HWEXCEPTION;
} }
} else if (env->nmi_injected) { } else if (env->nmi_injected) {
vector = NMI_VEC; vector = EXCP02_NMI;
intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_NMI; intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_NMI;
} else { } else {
have_event = false; have_event = false;
@ -390,6 +392,8 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
if (env->has_error_code) { if (env->has_error_code) {
wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR, wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR,
env->error_code); env->error_code);
/* Indicate that VMCS_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR is valid */
info |= VMCS_INTR_DEL_ERRCODE;
} }
/*printf("reinject %lx err %d\n", info, err);*/ /*printf("reinject %lx err %d\n", info, err);*/
wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info); wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info);
@ -399,7 +403,7 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
if (cpu_state->interrupt_request & CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI) { if (cpu_state->interrupt_request & CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI) {
if (!(env->hflags2 & HF2_NMI_MASK) && !(info & VMCS_INTR_VALID)) { if (!(env->hflags2 & HF2_NMI_MASK) && !(info & VMCS_INTR_VALID)) {
cpu_state->interrupt_request &= ~CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI; cpu_state->interrupt_request &= ~CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI;
info = VMCS_INTR_VALID | VMCS_INTR_T_NMI | NMI_VEC; info = VMCS_INTR_VALID | VMCS_INTR_T_NMI | EXCP02_NMI;
wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info); wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info);
} else { } else {
vmx_set_nmi_window_exiting(cpu_state); vmx_set_nmi_window_exiting(cpu_state);